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THE JOINDER OF ACTIONS IN INDIANA
BY BERNARD C. GAVIT*

See. 1. The Indiana Statutes. The subject of the joinder of
actions is covered by Sec. 286-288 Burns Annotated Indiana
Statutes, 1926. These sections are Sees. 106-108 of the Code of
Civil Procedure enacted in 1881,1 and were copied with but
slight changes (noted hereafter) from the original Code of
1852.2 The statutes are as follows:
Sec. 286. The plaintiff may unite several causes of action in the same
complaint, when they are included in either of the following classes:
First. Money demands on contract.
Second. Injuries to property.
Third. Injuries to person or character.
Fourth. Claims to recover the possession of personal property, with or
without damages for the withholding thereof, and for injuries to the property withheld.
Fifth. Claims to recover the possession of real property, with or without damages, rents and profits for the withholding thereof, and for waste
or damage done to the land; to make partition of and to determine and
quiet the title to real property.
Sixth. Claims to enforce the specific performance of contracts, and to
avoid contracts for fraud or mistake.
Seventh. Claims to foreclose mortgages; to enforce or discharge specific liens; to recover personal judgment upon the debt secured by such
mortgage or lien; to subject to sale real property upon demands against
decedents' estates when such property has passed to heirs, devisees or their
assigns; to marshal assets; and to substitute one person to the rights of
another; and all other causes of action arising out of a contract or a duty,
and not falling within either of the foregoing classes. But causes of
action so joined must affect all the parties to the action, and not require
different places of trial, and must- be separately stated and numbered.
See. 287. When the plaintiff desires to recover the possession of title
papers or other instructions of writing, or correct any mistakes therein,
a separate action may be brought therefor; or the possession of such title
papers or other instruments of writing may be recovered or mistakes corrected in any other action, when such recovery or correction would be
essential to a complete remedy.
See. 288. When the action arises out of contract, the plaintiff may
join such other matters in his complaint as may be necessary for a complete remedy and a speedy satisfaction of his judgment, although such
* Professor of Law, Indiana University.
Sec. 1.
1 Revised Stat. 1881, Secs. 278-280.
22 Revised Stat. 1852, p. 43, Sec. 70-72.
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other matters fall within some other one or more of the foregoing classes.
When several causes of action are united, belonging to any of the foregoing
classes, the court may order separate trials, for the furtherance of justice.

The changes made in 1881 were as follows: the phrase "and
for waste or damage done to the land" in Sec. 286 (5), and the
phrase "to recover personal judgment upon the debt secured by
such mortgage or lien" in Sec. 286 (7) were added by the Act of
1881, and the sentence in the same section and clause beginning
"But causes of actions so joined" was originally the last (but
unnumbered clause) in the section.3
Sec. 2. Joinder of Actions at Common Law and in Equity.
The common law had some rather simple rules as to the joinder
of actions. In the event that the plaintiff had several causes of
action against the defendant, if they were of such a character
that they all fell within the limifs of one writ (or form of action) they could then be joined. The plaintiff set them out
separately in several counts or paragraphs of his complaint.
Thus the plaintiff could sue upon a debt on a record and a debt
on a simple contract in the same action of debt.' Or he could
sue for two trespasses. But he could not join debt and assumpsit, or case and trespass, for example. The reason was again
that the cause of action, or substantive right, which the plaintiff
alleged and proved had to conform to the writ upon which the
action was based, and which was the foundation of the court's
2
jurisdiction.
There were two apparent exceptions to that rule. Debt and
detinue could be joined, as could also trover and case. The reason
however was that they sprang from the same writs.8
The Code Changes. The changes which the Code has made
have been far from satisfactory, and for the most part the code
rules are almost as artificial as the rules of the common law.
In truth the code prohibits joinder in a number of situations
where it would have been proper prior to the code. For example,
an action for negligent injury to property and for negligent
3 That is, the Act of 1852 was, "either of the foregoing classes; but
causes of action so joined, etc."
Sec. 2.
' Stephen, Pleading, 267; Flood v. Yandes, 1 Blackf. 102 (1820) (debt
on simple contract and debt on specialty properly joined); Farnham 'U.
Hay, 3 Blackf. 167 (1833) (semble).
2 See The Code Cause of Action, 6 Ind. L. J. 207-217.
3 Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading (1926) p. 295, note 4.
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injury to person could have been joined at common law without
question, for they were both covered by a writ in an action on
the case. Today they normally can be joined only if they "arise
out of the same transaction. '
In Equity. The law of the original writ 5 had no application
in equity. The result was that there did not develop in equity
any hard and fast rules which classified rights into specific categories. It is probably true that until more or less recent times
the court of equity did not conceive of itself as granting judicial
recognition to an existing right between the parties. The court
acted upon the theory that it was dealing with the conscience of
the parties and not their pre-existing rights. A suit in equity
was measured by what the court did rather than by what it
would do. It is to be doubted, therefore, as to whether, originally, there was any doctrine or rule as to joinder of actions (or
suits) in equity. Even where the court gave a variety of relief
it undoubtedly looked at the suit as one suit, rather than a
joinder of several suits. The leading text-book on Equity Pleading 6 has nothing to say about joinder of suits in equity. It does
have considerable space devoted to the joinder of parties, 7 but
the subject of joinder of suits is not even mentioned in the index.
The suit in equity, therefore, was an ex post facto affair and
consisted of the subject-matter which the court, in general,
thought could be conveniently disposed of at one time.8
To substantiate the conclusion that the courts of equity never
conceived of a problem as to the joinder of suits it may be noted
that the original rules in equity adopted by the Supreme Court
of the United States have several rules on the joinder of parties,
but none on the joinder of suits. 9 Apparently the first rule on
the latter is contained in the rules of 1912.10
Legal theory has here undergone considerable change, and
4 See infra, Sec. 16.

5 See The Code Cause of Action, cited supra n. 2.
6 Story, Equity Pleading (1838).

7 Ibid. Chap. IV and V.
8 Ibid., and see in particular Sec. 76c.

See also Gaines v. Chew, 2 How.

619 (1844).
9 See McGowan, The Lawyer's Handbook of Federal Practice (1891)
pp. 29-49.

10

They are found in the appendix to Vol. 226 U. S. Reports, and Vol.

1, U. S. Supreme Court Reports Digest, pp. 131-153. The rule is No. 26,
and provides, in part, "The plaintiff may join in one bill as many causes

of action, cognizable in equity, as he may have against the defendant."
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there is now little if any difference between the theories as to
functionings of the courts of law and equity. We now conceive
of equitable rights as pre-existing, and in so far as they fall
within different legal classifications of substantive rights, they
are regarded as separate and distinct rights. That is, a right
to the performance of a contract, and a right against continued
trespasses on Lot X are different rights, or causes of action,
even although the parties be the same. So in the Federal System and in states maintaining courts of law and equity there is
now a problem as to the joinder of actions, or suits.1 '
The problem was imposed upon the code states by the code.
The provisions of the code as to the joinder of actions applies
equally to those involving legal or equitable rights. As will be
noted hereafter, however, the courts when an equitable suit is
involved are rather prone to still talk about the problem as
though it were still only one as to joinder of parties.
Sec. 3. A Joinder of Actions and Not of Causes of Action.
The Code provides that "the plaintiff may unite several causes
of action in the same complaint." Under any view of the "cause
of action" it is impossible to unite "causes of action." The Code
here is rather ambiguous but it is apparent what is meant. It
is talking directly about the joinder of actions and of the indirect
joinder of "causes of action" and complaints based on them.
What the plaintiff really unites or joins are actions (judicial
proceedings) and not rights, claims or facts. Properly paraphrased the Code here reads "the plaintiff may unite, or add or
join to his original action, several actions, based upon several
substantive rights and set out in several paragraphs of one
complaint."
That is, fundamentally, the rules of procedure at common law,
and under the Code deal with the situation where one plaintiff is
suing one defendant and asserting against him one right.' The
normal judicial proceeding, therefore, was and is single in all
of those respects. The purpose of the provisions of the Code
here is to provide rules for the joinder or addition to such a
normal situation. This is particularly obvious when we consider
the subsequent provisions here that the "causes of action so
joined must affect all of the parties to the action, and not require
different places of trial and must be separately stated and num11 See, for example, 21 C. J. p. 413, et seq.
Sec. 8.
1 The statutes on Joinder of Parties are based on the same assumption.
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bered." As to whether or not the asserted rights in the several
paragraphs of complaint affect (legally interest) all of the parties to the action depends, obviously, as to what the action is. If
there is but one action and the joinder is of rights, or facts, or
complaints as part of one action, then this latter provision is
meaningless.2 That is, "the action" is what is joined, and if it
is, then obviously all the parties are interested or affected.
It must, therefore, be assumed here that "the action" means
something specific; that the added actions have the same parties
as the original action. The truth is that we must take "the
action" to be that which is represented by the first paragraph
of complaint, and the question then is as to whether the Code
here allows the subsequent actions as represented by the subsequent paragraphs of complaint to be joined to it.
The substance of the code provision here is that complaints
on several asserted rights may be united; the complaint is, of
course, a part of the action or judicial proceeding, so it is undoubtedly proper to speak of the joinder of complaints, and because the complaints necessarily assert several causes of actions,
or rights, it is not altogether improper to speak of the indirect
joinder of causes of action. But it is quite obvious after all
that the code is here dealing with the joinder of actions, and that
"the action" is the one represented by the first paragraph of
the complaint.
Sec. 4. Definition of the Code Terms Here. As indicated in
the preceding section "cause of action" again means specific
substantive right as a matter of substantive law.1 "Action" obviously means "judicial proceeding." "The action" means the
judicial proceeding based on the first paragraph of the com2 Cf., however, Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading (1928)

pp. 75-87, 308-311. The learned author defines "cause of action" to mean
the facts involved in any judicial proceeding as finally constituted under
the Code. This necessarily disposes of any questions of joinder, or at
least always begs the question. It disregards the fact that the Code specifically talks about joinder of complaints and actions and causes of action
and that the Code was laying down rules and not results.
Sec. 4.
1 The Code Cause of Action, 6 Ind. L. J., 203, 295. Cf. Cincinnati, H.
& D. R. v. Chester, 57 Ind. 297 (1877), holding that a husband could sue
for injuries to himself, the loss of his wife's services and for injuries to
a minor child in one action, where they arose out of the same accident,
because they constituted but one cause of action. The case is clearly at
variance with the other Indiana cases on the subject. See Sec. 11, and
Rogers v. Smith, 17 Ind. 323 (1861).
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plaint.2 "Claims" means the same as "action," for they are
obviously used synonymously. "Affect" means "legal interest." s
Sec. 5. Distinctions Between Indiana Code and Others. The
Indiana Code at this point has departed further from the original New York Codes than at any other point. In some respects
the Indiana Code on the joinder of actions is unique. The essential differences between the Indiana Code and those of the other
code states are as follows:
1. The Indiana Code allows a joinder of actions for injuries
to property, while the usual provisions in other states makes
separate classes as to actions for injuries to personal property
and those for injuries to real property.
2. The Indiana Code allows a general joinder of actions for
injuries to person or character, while most states make separate
classes of the two.
3. Classes 6 and 7, Sec. 286 Burns Annotated Indiana Stat-,
utes 1926 and also Secs. 287 and 288, are unique to Indiana.
4. The Indiana Code on joinder does not contain a "transaction" or "subject of the action" clause.' The only clause which
resembles it is Sec. 286 (7) ; "and all other causes of action arising out of a contract or a duty and not falling within either of
the foregoing classes."
5. The New York Code requires that the causes of action be
"consistent with each other," and as amended in 1920 leaves out
the requirement that the actions joined affect all the parties to
the action. 2
Sec. 6. Same Parties. The Code requires that the "causes
of action so joined must affect all of the parties to the action."
2 See supra Sec. 3.

3 See infra Sec. 6.
See. 5.
1 But see, Nave v. Powell, 62 Ind. App. 274 (1916), where a joinder of
actions was held proper because the causes of action involved "arose out
of the same transaction."
2 Cahill, N. Y. Civil Practice (1924), See. 258, p. 58. See Sherlock v.
Manwaren, 208 App. Div. 538, 203 N. Y. S. 709 (1924), for a decision
under the amendment of 1920. See Pomeroy, Code Remedies (5th Ed.
1929), p. 508, et seq., for a collection of the code provisions on joinder of
actions. And ef. Keller v. Boatman, 49 Ind. 104, 110 (1874), saying that
there was a misjoinder because "The judgments are inconsistent, and
unlike in kind," although there has never been any provision in the Indiana
to the effect that the causes of action joined be consistent.
See. 6.
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As pointed out above1 "the action" must be the judicial proceedings based on the first paragraph of the complaint. The requirement here is, then, that the parties to that action, and the parties
to the other actions joined with it, be the same-that is, the Code
contemplates only the joinder of actions between the same parties. Obviously the Code as to the joinder of parties to an action
applies to the action based on the first paragraph of the complaint, and to the actions joined with it. Having settled that
the parties to the first action involved are those allowed and
required by the Code 2 the parties which the Code allows and
requires to be parties to the other actions joined must be the
same as the parties to the first action.
The language of the Code is to the effect that the causes of
action involved in the actions joined "must affect all the parties
to the action." Or in other words the parties to the action must
be affected by all of the causes of action involved. It seems
quite obvious that "affected by" means "interested in,"3 and
that the test is that of legal or equitable interest. The question
is no different from that involved in whether or not one is interested in a cause of action within the meaning of the statute on
the joinder of parties. 4 Again, each party must be interested in,
or affected by, every cause of action involved in the actions
sought to be joined. Thus actions against a husband and wife
for the use and occupation of real estate, where one cause of
action was based upon the use and occupation by the wife prior
'Ante, Sec. 3.
2 Sec. 258-285 Burns' Ann Ind. Stat. 1926.
3 See the cases hereafter cited and also Tate v. Ohio and M. R., 10 Ind.

174 (1858); Virden v. Ellsworth, 15 Ind. 144 (1860) (action against lessee

and his guarantor; held, a misjoinder for no "unity of interest"); Rogers
v. Smith, 17 Ind. 323 (1861); Mathes v. Shank, 94 Ind. 501 (1883) (action
against two separate indorsees; held, two causes of action); Stewart v.
Alvis, 30 Ind. App. 237 (1903) (husband and wife may not join actions
for personal injuries against one defendant); Baker v. McCoy, 58 Ind.
215 (1877) (suit on several bonds against different parties; held, a misjoinder); Elliott v. Pontius, 136 Ind. 641 (1893) (actions by individual
creditors on separate claims cannot be joined); Boonville Nat. Bk. v.
Blakely, 166 Ind. 427 (1905) (semble); Ferguson v. Hull, 136 Ind. 339
(1893) (actions to review judgment and to enjoin acts of sheriff under
an execution thereon, held, a misjoinder); Ryder v. Jefferson Hotel Co.,
121 S. C. 72, 113 S. E. 474, 25 A. L. R. 739, semble.
4
Supra n. 2. The necessary and proper parties; the real parties in
interest are all determined by a reference to the substantive law; is this
party legally interested?
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to the marriage was held to present a misjoinder of actions, for
although both might be liable for the wife's occupation prior to
the marriage, the husband alone was liable for the use and
occupation after the marriage.5 And an action on a note signed
by two cannot be joined with an action on a check signed by but
one of the makers. 6
Must be the Same and Identical Parties. Not only must the
parties to each action be the same, but they must be identical.
So if one sues or is sued in different capacities the courts have
construed the statute in question to prohibit the joinder. Thus
a father cannot join actions for his own personal injuries and
for the death of his minor child, because as to the latter he really
recovers in a representative capacity. 7
Thus D individually and D as administrator are not identical
persons and a joinder of actions against D in those two capaci8
ties is forbidden by the usual construction of the Code.
This may be in keeping with the rule that the law may regard
a person as an individual and as an officer or trustee as not
identical, and to a certain degree may recognize them as different
persons.9 The propriety of the application of that distinction
here, however, may well be doubted. The distinction primarily
has to do with the doctrine of res judicata, 10 and it might well
have been said that the code here was talking about the same
parties or persons and not identical parties or persons within the
meaning of that doctrine.
But the distinction seems to be fairly well established in the
Indiana decisions."
No Question of Misjoinder if Only One Cause of Action. In
this connection it is well to remember that there can be no question of misjoinder until it is decided that the plaintiff is assert5 Tobin v. Connery, 13 Ind. 65 (1859).
6 Wilson v. Broadlick, (Ind. App.) 169 N. E. 346 (1929).
7 Cincinnati,H. & D. R. v. Chester, 57 Ind. 297 (1877).
8 The exact question apparently has not been decided by the Indiana
courts, probably due to the fact that the practice here does not permit an
action against an administrator or executor except under the conditions
imposed by Burns' Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926, Sec. 3152-3172. See, however, the
case cited supra note 7 and Fischer v. Hintz, 145 Minn. 161, 176 N. W. 177
(1920); Clark, Handbook of the Law of Code Pleading (1928), p. 302;
Pomeroy, Code Remedies (5th Ed. 1929), p. 579 et seq.
9 26 R. C. L. p. 1345 et seq.
10 Ibid.
11 See Cincinnati,H. & D. R. v. Chester, 57 Ind. 297 (1877).
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ing more than one cause of action or substantive right. As has
been pointed out heretofore one must always turn to the substantive law to determine whether or not out of the factual
situation upon which the plaintiff relies there is created but one
cause of action. 12 If it be decided or assumed that there is but
one cause of action asserted we may have a question of the
joinder of parties, but no question as to the joinder of actions.
Here, as elsewhere, the problem as to how many separate
rights arise out of a given situation has been settled primarily
by looking to the traditional classifications of rights as developed
by the common law and equity. The principal difficulty arises
here under the latter, due largely to the fact that the suit in
equity was an ex post facto affair.' 3 So, here, several creditors,
having separate debts, may join in an action to set aside a fraudulent conveyance made by their common debtor, and there is
but one cause of action, that is, they are regarded in equity as
asserting a joint right.14 But if the plaintiffs fail to prove the
facts as to the fraudulent conveyance the suit in equity fails;
there arises a misjoinder as to causes of action and the plaintiffs
cannot recover judgment on their several debts.' 5 In the case
cited, however, the plaintiffs had not prayed for judgment on the
debts, and it was said that the judgment in that suit would not
bar subsequent separate actions by the individual creditors on
their debts.
If the plaintiffs had prayed judgment on their debts the proper
procedure would seem to depend on a number of considerations.
It is submitted that it might still be possible to proceed in equity
on the theory that if parties have started a suit in equity in good
faith, and upon reasonable grounds, and fail to prove the strictly
equitable cause of action asserted, the court of equity may proceed to render a judgment for damages. That is, the court of
equity can give damages as supplemental 'relief'6 and the mere
failure to prove all of the plaintiff's case does not necessarily
12 The Code Cause of Action, 6 Ind. L. J. 203-223.

13 Supra See. 2.

14 Doherty v. Holliday, 137 Ind. 282 (1893); Elliott v. Pontius, 136 Ind.
641 (1893); Field v. Holzman, 93 Ind. 205 (1883); Strong v. Taylor School
Trustees, 79 Ind. 208 (1881); Ruffing v. Tilton, 12 Ind. 259 (1859).
15 Elliott v. Pontius, 136 Ind. 641 (1893).
16Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence (4th Ed. 1918), Sees. 236-242;
Doherty v. Hilliday, 137 Ind. 282 (1893); Spidell v. Johnson, 128 Ind. 235
(1890); Albrecht v. Foster Lbr. Co, 126 Ind. 318 (1890); Faught V.
Faught, 98 Ind. 470 (1884); Murphy v. Blair, 12 Ind. 184 (1859).
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destroy the court's jurisdiction over that action. The court of
equity must have had jurisdiction in the first instance; the
failure to give strictly equitable relief must arise out of a failure
of proof on controverted evidence and be such as to indicate
that nevertheless the plaintiff reasonably assumed that he had
an equitable cause of action. 17
If the failure of proof was such as to indicate that the equitable action was not brought in good faith upon reasonable
grounds, and was such, therefore, as to destroy the equitable
jurisdiction of the court, there would arise questions as to misjoinder of actions under the clause in question, and also as to the
right to jury trial. When the court finds that the equitable cause
of action is non-existent it is submitted that that fact alone does
not ipso facto dispose of the case. The court is in truth a court
of law and equity; proper pleadings are no longer necessary to
support a judgment'18 and were the court to enter several judgments on the causes of action proved there would be no reversible error;19 especially in view of the fact that misjoinder of
actions and jury trial may each be waived.20
If the defendant in some manner presented the questions it is
apparent that the trial court would have to docket the separate
actions as such,21 and grant a jury trial. 22 The granting of a
jury trial would necessarily require the setting aside of the
original submission and the parties would clearly then be in a
position to raise the question as to misjoinder.
17 Roberts v. Lentzke, 39 Ind. App. 577, 586 (1906); Pomeroy op cit.
supra n. 15, Sec. 237 (e). The learned author cites the case of Blair v.

Smith, 114 Ind. 114 (1887), as sustaining this rule, but the case merely
decides that the fact that one can recover damages alone against a constructive trustee does not destroy equity jurisdiction. The court in Boonville Nat. Bk. v. Blakely, 166 Ind. 427, 450, 451 (1905), admits the validity
of the rule, but held that there never was an equitable cause of action
asserted. Lefforge v. West, 2 Ind. 514 (1851) (semble).
18 See, e. g., Cleveland, C. C. & St. L. Ry. v. Gillespie, (Ind. App. 1930),
173 N. E. 708, and n. 6 Ind. L. J. 402.
19 Boonville Nat. Bank v. Blakely, 166 Ind. 427 (1905); Sec. 364 Burns

Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.

20 Sec. 366, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926 (waiver of misjoinder); Sec.
574 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926 (waiver of jury trial) and Boonville Nat.
Bank v. Blakely, 166 Ind. 427 (1905).
21 Sec. 363, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926. It is to be noted, however,
that the Supreme Court in the case of Boonville Nat. Bank v. Blakely, 166

Ind. 427, 447 (1905), considered the misjoinder to be as to parties and
not 22actions.
Boonville Nat. Bank v. Blakely, supra n. 19.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

The case of Boonville Nat. Bank v. Blakely,23 is the converse
of the case of Elliott v. Pontius,24 there being there involved the

assertion of separate claims by one plaintiff (trustee in bankruptcy) to avoid separate preferences given to different defendants. It was held that a general allegation of conspiracy was
not sufficient to give rise to a joint equitable right against the
several defendants, and that consequently there was a misjoinder. In keeping with the historical aspects of the equitable
suit the court regarded the misjoinder as being one of parties
and not of actions, 2 5 but it is submitted that this is clearly
erroneous. The court held that there was no single equitable
cause of action in fact asserted, and it appears quite plain that
then there was a misjoinder of equitable or legal actions 26 under
the clause in question because of the non-interest of one defendant in thecause of action against his co-defendants.
In the principal case the procedure was sought to be upheld
upon the theory that admitting that there would normally be
several actions improperly joined that the suit was one equitable suit in the nature of a Bill of Peace to avoid multiplicity of
actions. The court, however, rejected that view, on the ground
that the actions involved no common questions of fact, but only
a common question of law (unlawful preference).27
Joint Liability in Tort. The questions of liability in tort for
joint, or concurrent acts, or for conspiracy are essentially questions of joinder of parties rather than of joinder of actions.
The substantive law is that the acts of several, if joint or concurrent, or pursuant to an agreement, creates one cause of action
against all, or separate causes of action against each. And there
are occasions when equity imposes a tort liability where the acts
are cumulative rather than concurrent or joint. In any of these
cases there is no question of a joinder of action, but only one of
28
joinder of parties.
Bill of Peace an Exception. In so far as the courts today recognize the Bill of Peace there is an exception to the statute in
23 Ibid.

24

Supra n. 15.
Supra Sec. 2.
26 The court in truth held that the defendants were entitled to a jury
trial forcing the conclusion that after all there was a misjoinder of actions
at law.
27 At p. 441.
25

2

8Supra

n. 2.
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question.

Several persons are permitted to prosecute admittedly

separate causes of action to avoid a multiplicity of actions, or
one is permitted to sue many on separate causes of actions, if the
actions present a common question of fact and law. That such
a procedure is proper today is well recognized. 29 Although it is
probably true again that the courts are prone to look upon the

situation as involving a joinder of parties in equity rather than
a joinder of actions.
A Statutory Exception. There is at least one statutory exception also. Sec. 261 Burns Annotated Indiana Statutes 1926
provides:
"Whenever any public officer or other person is required by the laws of
this state to give bond for the performance of his duties and more than
one bond is given by the same officer or person for the performance of
such duties, either during the same period of time or for successive periods
of time, any person entitled to sue upon either of said bonds may bring a
joint suit upon all or any number of said bonds, and, in such action, the
liability of all the respective sureties thereon shall be determined by the
court or jury."

The statute allows the joinder of suits against separate sureties on separate bonds, regardless of the non-interest of some
defendants in the cause of action against other. defendants. It
has been held to permit a joinder of actions on more than one
bond given in a guardianship proceeding 30 and also a joinder
31
of actions on bonds given by a public road contractor, regard-

less of the fact that the sureties on the bonds were different.
Consolidation of Actions Creates an Exception. As a practi-

cal matter the efficacy of this requirement is extinguished by
the doctrine of consolidation of actions discussed in Section 24
infra. The result there is that actions which may not be joined
may nevertheless be consolidated if a single trial is expedient,
and even although the parties be different.
Sec. 7.

Venue of Actions JoinedMust be Same.

Sec. 286 (7)

provides that "causes of action so joined must not require
(dictum); Boonville
29 Thompson v. Turner, 173 Ind. 593, 598 (1910)
Nat. Bank v. Blakely, 166 Ind. 427 (1905); Vandalia Coal Co. v. Lawson,
43 Ind. App. 226 (1909); Muncie Natural Gas Co. v. Muncie, 160 Ind. 97
(1908) ; Story, Equity Pleading (3d Ed. 1844), Sec. 124 et seq. 21 C. J.
p. 78 et seq.
30 Statsex rel. v. Parsons,147 Ind. 579 (1897).
31 Massachusetts Bonding Co. v. State ex tel., 82 Ind. App. 377 (1924).
Sec. 7.

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

different places of trial."

The purpose of this provision was to

make it certain that the statute on the joinder of actions did not
repeal any of the provisions of the Code as to the venue of ac-

tions.1

It is believed that no case has been decided by the Su-

preme or Appellate Court involving this specific provision 2 but
it is apparent what the statute means. If under the venue statutes the actions should have been brought in different counties
they cannot be joined. s
How is the Question Raised? Primarily the question is one as
to the venue of actions rather than their joinder. The place of
action may be jurisdictional or not depending normally upon
4
whether or not the subject matter involves real property. If it
goes to the jurisdiction of the subject matter it cannot be waived
and the question may be raised at any time; if the action is
transitory, the place of bringing the action is not jurisdictional,
and the question can only be properly presented by a plea in
abatement. 5
The Code provides that a question of misjoinder of actions
may be raised by demurrer or answer depending on whether or
not the defect is apparent on the face of the complaint. 6 Suppose there is involved in a given case the misjoinder of actions
by the addition of an action which is admittedly transitory because the transitory action should have been brought in another
county, may the defendant raise the question by demurrer or
answer, or must he raise it by a plea in abatement to the second
action? 7 Would the failure to file a plea in abatement here
waive the question of venue both under the venue statute and
the joinder statute? If the defendant consents (as he may) to
the trial of the transitory action in the wrong county, do the
I Sees. 323-330 Burns' Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
2 None of the cases cited in Watson's Revision of Work's Practice and
Forms (1918), v. 1, Sec. 295 note 7, decide any question under the joinder

statutes.
3 The question has apparently not been raised very often. See, 1 C. J.
p. 1077; Clark, Han.dbook of the Law of Code Pleading (1928), p. 304.
4 Supra n. 1.
5 Sec. 389, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
6 Secs. 362, 366, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
7 Thus an action for injury to real property is brought in the county
where the real estate is situated, and an action for injury to personal
property is joined to it. The defendant lives in another country. The
actions fall within Sec. 286 (2) Burns Ann. Stat. Ind. 1926, and the
parties are the same, and the only objection is on the ground of venue
under See. 286 (7).
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actions joined "require different places of trial?" It is submitted that they do not and that it ought to be held that the
question would be waived by a failure to file a plea in abatement.
That is "require different places of trial" means as a practical
proposition and not from an entirely theoretical standpoint.8
Sec. 8. Money Demands on Contract. Under the first section
of the joinder statute the plaintiff is permitted to join actions
based on causes of action described as "money demands on contract." Sec. 900 Burns Annotated Indiana Statutes 1926 defines
that phrase as meaning "an action arising out of contract when
the relief demanded is a recovery of money." The statute is
based upon the traditional classification of actions into actions
ex contractuand ex delicto,l and limits the joinder to those falling within the first group, provided also the action is to recover
damages rather than some equitable relief. If the actions in
question are based upon actions at law to recover damages for
the breach of a contract, either express or implied in fact the
statute clearly permits the joinder.2 And it makes no difference
that the contractual obligations arise out of different forms of
contracts. Thus the plaintiff may join actions on an express
contract and the common counts ;3 and an action on a promissory
note with one on an indemnity bond; 4 and an action on a written
contract with one on an oral contract.5
Must Money Judgment be Sole Relief? Does Contract Include
Quasi-Contract?Two questions present themselves at this point.
Must the demand for a money judgment be the sole relief asked,
8 In the case of Wilson v. L. & N., (Ky.) 112 S. W. 585 (1908), the
question was raised by a plea in abatement.
See. 8.
'Miami County Bank v. State, ex rel., 61 Ind. App. 360, 373 (1916);
The Cincinnati W. and M. R. v. Harris, 61 Ind. 290 (1878); Boyer v.
Tiedeman, 34 Ind. 72 (1870); Coddington v. Canoday, 157 Ind. 243 (1901).
2 See cases cited in notes 3-5 infra.
3 Bates v. Dehaven, 10 Ind. 319 (1858) (no question of misjoinder was
raised in this case, but no objection was raised to the propriety of such a
joinder by the parties or the court); Wilstach v. Hawkins, 14 Ind. 541
(1860)

(semble).

Cf. Grant v. Davis, 5 Ind. App. 116 (1892) (such actions were brought
separately and consolidated; held, no error). See See. 24 infra as to consolidation of actions.
4 South Side Planing Mill v. Cutler & S. Lbr. Co, 64 Ind. 560 (1878).
5 Board v. Newlin, 132 Ind. 27 (1892) (question not raised, but procedure assumed to be correct); Everroad v. Schwartzkopf, 123 Ind. 35
(1889) (semble); Wolcott v. Yeager, 11 Ind. 84 (1858) (semble).
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and does "contract" include "quasi-contract?" As to the first,
suppose the plaintiff sues on what is clearly a contract obligation and asks only a money judgment and in a second paragraph
of complaint sues on another contract and asks specific performance and supplemental damages, or damages in the alternative;
is there a misjoinder?6 It is believed that no case has been
decided in Indiana settling the question, but it is submitted
there would be a misjoinder, under this clause3 Suits for
specific performance, reformation, and foreclosure are dealt with
in later provisions of the statute and are put in separate classes,
indicating that the first class, (money demands on contract) is
limited to actions where the sole relief sought is a judgment for
damages. The distinction is not necessarily between legal and
equitable actions for one may have an equitable action where the
8
sole relief sought is a money judgment.
As to the second, suppose again the plaintiff sues on what
clearly falls within the first class, and joins an action based upon
the fact of a conversion of personal property by the defendant
but upon the waiver of the tort and upon the theory that the
conversion created a debt recoverable under a count for "money
had and received." Or suppose the second count is based upon
a claim for money paid under mistake. In either event the
defendant's obligation is quasi-contractual; and upon a so-called
promise implied in law. If the language of the courts be taken
at its face value and it be true that the distinction here is between the traditional actions ex contractu and ex delicto9 the
joinder is proper. There is a dictum in The Indianapolis & C.
R. v. Bollurd l o involving a somewhat similar phrase in the
counter-claim statute to the effect that a tort liability may be
"waived and implied assumpsit relied upon" under that statute.
"Contract" in the New York Code (in this connection) has been
construed to mean "quasi-contract."' 1 The result ought to be
6 The answer to the qvestion is simple under the usual Code, because
the provision in New York and elsewhere is that a joinder is permitted if
the actions be on "contract express or implied," and regardless of whether
the actions be "legal or equitable."
7 See later discussion of the effect of clause 7 on this clause 1 in this
same section; and also Sec. 15 infra.
8 Blair v. Smith, 114 Ind. 114 (1887).

9Supra note 1.
10 22 Ind. 448, 451 (1864).
11Hawk v. Thorn, 54 Barb. 164 (1869).
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the same in Indiana. It has been held that actions for breach
of trust are ex delicto.12
How Affected by See. 286 (7). The seventh clause of the same
section of the Code provides that the plaintiff may join "all other
causes of action arising out of a contract or a duty and not falling within either of the foregoing classes." The proper interpretation and the effect of clause 7 are discussed in Section 16
infra.
Sec. 9. Actions Joined Must Fall Within the Classes Created
by the Statute. It is well at this point to emphasize what the
Code here makes very plain, that is, that the various clauses
create classes of actions, and that the question of joinder is to
be settled by ascertaining as to whether or not all the actions
joined fall within any of the classes so created. Thus it is clear
that the Code does not permit the joinder of actions on contract
liabilities with actions on tort liabilities.' An action in eject-2
ment cannot be joined with an action to foreclose a mortgage.
An action to quiet title to real estate cannot be joined with an
action to recover damages for the maintenance of a nuisance. 3
Sec. 10. Injuries to Property. Clause 2 of the statute in
question allows the joinder of actions based on "injuries to property." Sec. 900 Burns Annotated Indiana Statutes 1926 defines
"property" as including "personal and real property." It defines "personal property" as including "goods, chattels, evidences
of debt and things in action." It defines "real property" as including "lands, tenements and hereditaments."'
It has been assumed in a number of cases that separate actions for injuries to personal property (e. g., against a railroad
for killing of animals at different times) could be joined, if
separately stated. 2 And it was decided in The Chicago and Erie
R. v. Kern,3 that injuries to real estate and personal property
12 Coddington v. Canady, 157 Ind. 243 (1901).
See. 9.
1 See the cases cited supra Sec. 8, note 1, and also, Hardwick v. Wilson,
40 Ind. 321 (1872) (dictum); Clark v. Lineberger, 44 Ind. 223, 227 (1873)
(dictum); Keller v. Boatman, 49 Ind. 104, 110 (1874) (dictum); The Cincinnati, W. & M. R. v. Harris, 61 Ind. 290 (1878) (dictum); Nave v.
Powell, 62 Ind. App. 274, 283 (1916).
2
Butler University v. Conard, 94 Ind. 353 (1883).
3 City of Huntington v. Stemen, 37 Ind. App. 553 (1906).
See. 10.
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arising out of the same negligent act constituted but one cause
of action, requiring but one paragraph of complaint. It was
assumed in Ross v. Thompson,4 that an action for injury to a
private way could be joined with one for an injury to a public
way. It is believed that there are no other Indiana cases involving a construction of this clause except the case of Bailey v. Indianiapolis Abattoir Co. hereafter discussed.
May the Actions Joined be Some Legal and Some Equitable?
As noted above it appears 5 reasonably clear that class one as a
practical proposition is usually limited to legal actions. Is that
true here? It is submitted that it is not, and that one, for example, could join an action based on the destruction of an automobile by the defendant with an action to enjoin threatened or
continued trespass on the plaintiff's land by the defendant. The
code has created but one form of action for legal and equitable
rights6 and unless the context here prohibits the joinder of actions based on them, "action" here must mean "legal" or "equitable." There seems to be no question but that the only possible
construction of the code here is that actions based both upon
legal and equitable rights involving injuries to property may be
joined.
Are deceit and FraudInjuries to Person or Injuries to Prop.
erty?7 Suppose P has a cause of action against D for personal
injuries and that by fraudulent means D secures a release, is
an action based on the fraud (either to avoid the release or
recover damages) an action involving injury to property or
person? It was decided in Bailey v. IndianapolisAbattoir Co.7
that it involved an injury to property and not to person. The
decision must turn on whether or not the plaintiff owned the
right to be free from fraudulent misrepresentation as an incident to his properties or as an incident to his rights of personality. The answer is not so obvious as the court in the case
cited assumed it to be, but the case is in accord with the only
I As to the distinctions between these words see Owens v. Lewis, 46 Ind.
488, 508 (1874), and Adams v. Merrill, 45 Ind. App. 315, 326 (1909).
2 See Louisville, N. A. & C. R. v. Quode, 101 Ind. 364 (1884), and cases

there cited.
3

9 Ind. App. 505 (1893).

4 78 Ind. 90, 92 (1881).

5 Supra Sec. 8.
6 Secs. 256, 357, Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
7 66 Ind. App. 465 (1918).
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other case involving the point with which the author is familiar.8
But the New York case cited turns upon a New York statute
defining injury to property as "an actionable act whereby the
estate of another is lessened, other than a personal injury or the
breach of a contract."
Breach of Trust. It has been held that an action for breach
of trust is an action ex delicto and therefore for injury to property. 9
Action to Quiet Title. The code puts an action to quiet title in
class 5, and it, therefore, does not fall within the general class
of actions for injuries to property. Such an action may not be
joined with an action for damages resulting from nuisance.' 0
What Constitutes One Cause of Action for Injuries to Property? Again we must emphasize the proposition that there is
no question as to joinder of actions, or causes of action, until it
is decided that as a result of the factual situations involved the
substantive law has created more than one substantive right in
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant. It is of course
obvious that if defendant has trespassed on plaintiff's real estate
and has negligently run into plaintiff's automobile on the public
highway the next day, that the law would regard those situations
as creating two separate causes of action. If, however, while
trespassing on plaintiffs' real estate defendant intentionally or
negligently runs into plaintiff's automobile or steals it, is there
one cause of action or two? There is little doubt but that at
common law plaintiff could recover for the trespass q. c. f. and
for the intentional injuries or taking (at least) as to the personal property in an action of trespass q. e. f., the latter damages being recovered as consequential damages to the original
trespass." But it probably is also true that the plaintiff could
bring one or two actions, 12 and if he could treat the actions as
separate for the purposes of a separate suit on one, there is
little reason why he could not treat them as separate for the
8

Benedict v. Guardian Trust Co., 58 App. Div. 302, 68 N. Y. S. 1082

(1901).
9 Coddington v. Canady, 157 Ind. 243 (1908).
10 City of Huntington v. Steman, 37 Ind. App. 553 (1906).
"Donohue v. Dyer, 23 Ind. 521 (1864) ; Richardson v. Brewer, 81 Ind.
107 (1881).
See also, Indiana Pipe Line Co. v. Christiansen, 195 Ind. 106

(1924). (Damages to real property and cattle recoverable in one action
but on the theory of a nuisance rather than trespass.)
12Board of Commissioners v. Trees, 12 Ind. App. 479 (1895); American Sand & Gravel Co. v. Spencer, 55 Ind. App. 523 (1913).
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purposes of a joinder. In the event the so-called consequential
injury were to an incorporeal right, (for example, to plaintiff's
business, as distinct from his physical properties) there is an
intimation in the case of Cleveland, C. C., etc. Ry. v. Simpson's
that the damages for such injury cannot be recovered in an
action for injuries to the real estate. Such a result would be
hard to justify, especially in view of the decision in Donokue v.
Dyer 14 permitting a plaintiff to recover for the seduction of
his daughter as consequential damages in an action of trespass
q. c. f, the injury there no longer being to the father's loss of
service. In the Simpson case, however, in view of the authorities cited by the court, probably the fair interpretation of the
decision is that the court was of the opinion that such damages
could not be recovered as a matter of substantive law rather
than as a matter of misjoinder of actions.
Joint Liability in Tort. As seen above 15 the question of liability for joint or concurrent acts, for conspiracy, and for equitable torts, are essentially, too, questions of the substantive law.
If there is joint or concurrent action (or what equity regards
as such) the result is one cause of action against several, rather
than separate causes of action against each.
Several Trespasses to Real Estate. At common law it was
possible to recover for several trespasses to real estate in the
same paragraph of complaint, under a continuando whereby the
several trespasses were considered as one trespass. 16 Such a
17
complaint presents a question as to the separate statement,
18
but it has been held good under the code.
The same result is reached if the plaintiff seeks to recover
for a so-called "continuing trespass" or nuisance.1 9
13 182 Ind. 693, 702 (1915).

The case of Wilson v. Smith, 10 Wend.

(N. Y.) 324 (1833), is contrary: holding that there is but one cause of
action for an intentional trespass to real etate with consequent damages
to an incorporeal right.
14 23 Ind. 521 (1864). But see, Sec. 262 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926
and Sec. 11 infra.
15 Sec. 6.

16 Rucker v. M'Neely, 4 Blackf. 179 (1836) ; Pierce v. Pickens, 16 Mass.
470 (1820).
17 See infra Sec. 20.
18 Holcraft v. King, 25 Ind. 352 (1865).
19 Indiana Pipe Line Co. v. Christensen, 195 Ind. 106 (1924); City of
North Vernon v. Voegler, 103 Ind. 314 (1885).
Sec. 11.
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See. 11. Injuries to Person or Character. Class 3 permits
the joinder of actions for injuries to person or character. Apparently there is but one decision under this clause. It was held
in the case of Thomas v. Dabblemont' that actions against a
doctor for malpractice and assault and battery were not misjoined for they were "both in tort." The clause clearly permits
joinder of any action for injuries to the person, and also such
2
actions as libel and slander and malicious prosecution.
3
In another connection it has been held that "injuries to person" includes an action for seduction of the plaintiff's daughter.4 The only Indiana case on the point does not decide the
point, holding merely that damages for seduction might be recovered as aggravated damages in an action of trespass q. c. f.5
The result in Indiana ought to be the same for the reason that
in Georgia and in Indiana the gist of the action is no longer loss
of services. 6
Husband's Action for Loss of Services of Wife or Child. The
question then presents itself as to whether or not an action by
a father for loss of services resulting from injuries to his wife
or minor child is an action for injuries to person or to property.
The author can find no case in which the point has been specifically determined, doubtless because the question does not often
arise, as most states have a "same transaction clause" in the
joinder statute, and the injuries to the husband and wife normally result from the same accident and the causes of action
obviously arise out of the same transaction, or are connected
with the subject of the action within the meaning of those
phrases. Neither of those phrases being contained in the Indi' 31 Ind. App. 146 (1903).
In those states where the code makes separate classes for injuries to
person and character it has been held in some states that malicious prosecution is an action for injury to character and in other states that it is
an action for injury to person. See, Pomeroy Code Remedies (5th Ed.
1929) Sec. 390 and 1 C. J. p. 1079. The problem is not presented, of
course, by the Indiana Code. If the language used is not libelous or slanderous per se the plaintiff must prove damage to business; and in such
cases the action is for injury to property. It is believed, however, that
the action should for the purposes of joinder be classified as an action for
injury to character.
3 Under a statute of limitations making distinctions between injuries to
person and property.
4 Hutcherson v. Durden, 113 Ga. 987, 39 S. E. 495 (1901).
5 Donohue v. Dyer, 23 Ind. 521 (1864).
6 See, Sec. 272 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926 and cases there cited.
2
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ana Code 7 a question of misjoinder is presented in a very frequent situation.
It would seem that the gist of the action is the injury to the
husband's right to his wife's services and that the action would,
therefore, be for injuries to property. Under the statute of
limitations, however, where there is a distinction between actions for injuries to person and actions for injuries to property
the Indiana Supreme Court has held that the action by the husband is barred by the two year statute as to injuries to person. 8
This case is in accord with the authorities in other states, 9 and
doubtless the court would apply the case to the joinder statute.
There are, likewise, no cases upon the specific point as regards
a father's action for injuries resulting in loss of services to his
minor child, and none as to the applicability of the statute of
limitations. In other states the cases on the last point are not
in accord. 10 There would seem to be no distinction in principle
between the two situations, and it is most probable that the
courts would consider the Mullen case as decisive in this instance also.
If the case of The Cincinnati,H. & D. R. v. Chester, discussed
in the next sub-section, is a binding decision on the point, the
problem is removed, for there is but one cause of action rather
than two or more, and, therefore, no question of joinder.
As seen above" actions for fraud and deceit are actions for
injuries to property and not to person.' 2
What Constitutes One Cause of Action. Here again we are
confronted with the problem as to how many rights the substantive law creates out of a given situation. In this connection it
was said in the case of The Cincinnati,H. & D. R. v. Chester's
that "it seemed to the court" that a father's rights for injuries
to himself, to his wife (resulting in loss of services) and to a
minor son (resulting in loss of services) resulting from one
7 Cf. Nave v. Powell, 62 Ind. App. 274 (1916). Holding that because a
cause of action on contract and one on tort arose out of the same transaction they could be joined. The court makes no reference to the Indiana
Code, and cites only an Ohio case. See further discussion of this case in
Sec. 16 infra.
8 Mullen v. Town of Newcastle, 180 Ind. 386 (1913).
9 See 37 C. J. p. 775.
10 See 37 C. J. p. 776.
11 See. 10 supra.
12Bailey v. Indianapolis Abbatoir Co., 66 Ind. App. 465 (1918).
Is 57 Ind. 297 (1877).
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negligent act on the part of the defendant constituted but one
cause of action, for which he could recover in a single paragraph
of complaint. As a precedent the case is of doubtful weight, as
the court prefaced its statement by the phrase "it seems to us"
and actually decided that the motion to separate the causes of
action filed by the defendant and overruled was too broad to
present any question.
As seen above the code probably permits the joinder if it be
held that more than one cause of action results, and the sole
question is as the separate statement, and as the improper overruling of a motion to separate is not reversible error, 14 the question is more or less academic. The weight of authority is clearly
to the effect that there are several causes of action rather than
one resulting from such a situation.' 5 The question usually
arises as to whether one cause is barred by a settlement or
judgment as to the other, so that practically all of the cases to
the contrary can be explained on the modern doctrine of res
judicata; that is, under the joinder statute the plaintiff "might
have" sued on all of the causes of action at once, and having
failed to do so he is nevertheless barred. 16
It is believed that the profession in Indiana has not followed
the suggestion in the Chester case, and regards a cause of action
for injuries to a father as separate and distinct from those for
injuries to his wife and children.
As to whether they might fall within the clause "causes of
action arising out of a contract or a duty" is discussed later in
Section 16.
Sec. 12. Actions to Recover Possession of PersonalProperty
and Damages. The fourth class created by the code is for
"claims to recover the possession of personal property, with or
without damages for the withholding thereof, and for injuries
to the property withheld." The only common law actions for
the possession of personal property were the actions of detinue
and replevin. These have now been combined under the code
under the general name of replevin.' As to what would amount
14 Secs. 20 and 23 infra.
15 See notes, L. R. A. 1917 C 543; 2 A. L. R. 592; 25 A. L. R. 743;
55 A. L. R. 936 and 30 C. J. 961.
16 See The Code Cause of Action, 6 Ind. L. J. 295-298.
Sec. 12.
1 Secs. 1314-1326 Burns Ann. Ind. Stat. 1926.
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to one taking or one detention so as to constitute but one cause
of action is again a question of fact and of the substantive law.
However, in view of the fact that the joinder of the actions
would be proper whenever the plaintiff seeks the recovery of the
possession the question as to whether or not there was one or
more cause of action joined would present a question only as to
the separate statement, and any real decision on the point is
practically evaded by the rule that an erroneous ruling would
not be reversible error. 2
Equitable Actions. One can also maintain a suit in equity for
the restitution of personal property if the property comes within the definition as to "unique chattels."3 There would seem to
be no reason why such a suit could not be joined with the legal
action of replevin, as again the code makes no distinction between legal and equitable actions.
Damages Recovered Also. It probably is true today that the
law regards the right to the possession of personal property and
the right to damages for its unlawful possession as one right,
the latter being incidental to the first. In view of Sections 601
and 624 Burns Annotated Indiana Statutes, 1926, providing that
the verdict and judgment in a replevin suit shall be for the possession and "damages for the taking and detention" there would
seem to be little doubt as to that conclusion in Indiana, although
from the joinder statute in question there might be an inference
that there were separate causes of action for the possession and
damages for unlawful detention.
The joinder statute, however, does go further and provides
that actions for "injuries to the property withheld" might be
joined to the action for possession. The measure of damages in
a replevin suit is normally the depreciation, loss of use and expenses accruing between the time the right to possession accrues
and the action is started. 4 If the action is based on a wrongful
taking in the first instance, the damages would necessarily include the damages for injuries, as they would come within the
term of "depreciation," and a separate paragraph of complaint
would be unnecessary. If, however, the damages for injuries
accrued subsequent to the commencement of the action, it would
be necessary to file an additional paragraph of complaint based
upon them, and the code here distinctly allows the joinder.
2 Secs. 20 and 23 infra.
3 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisdiction (4th ed. 1918) Sec. 175 et seq.
4 Yelton v. Slinkard, 85 Ind. 190 (1882).
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If the damages for injury were involved in an action founded,
not upon an unlawful taking, but upon a wrongful detention
arising out of a proper demand for possession and the wrongful
refusal to give possession, it is submitted that damages for injuries occurring prior to the demand could'not be recovered in
the action of replevin. So again a separate paragraph of complaint ought to be filed for those damages. The right here might
be based solely on a contract to safely keep the property, and not
upon the violation of any duty supporting a tort action. The
second paragraph of complaint would be ex contractu necessarily: whereas the first would be ex delicto: but it seems very
plain that again the joinder would be proper because of the specific language of the statute. It is to be noted that the damages
for injuries must be to the property involved in the replevin
action.
Conversion and Replevin. It is said in the case of Beals v.
Stewart,5 that this section specifically allows the joinder of an
action of replevin with an action for the conversion of the same
property. This would seem to be the fair construction of the
statute. Under the New York code the actions would be inconsistent.6 But there is no such requirement in the Indiana code.
The plaintiff should not, of course, recover on both paragraphs
of his complaint and would be required to elect between them
before judgment. 7 (That point was not involved in the Baals
case as the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the replevin action
before trial.)
To be concluded
5109
Ind. 371 (1886).
6
Drexel v. Hollander, 112 App. Div. 25, 98 N. Y. S. 104 (1906).
7 There is considerable confusion in the law of Election of Remedies
and much criticism concerning it. This is one instance where it must be
applied, otherwise the plaintiff recovers twice for the same (although
legally different) injury. But the plaintiff need not be compelled to elect
until after the verdict.
Sec. 18.
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